An
International Workshop
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[ DRAFT Workshop Proceedings ] |
Institutional Infrastructures for Global Research Networks
in the Public Sector
Michael
Spence
St. Catherine's College, Oxford
There is no doubt
that global research networks have the potential greatly to increase our
understanding, particularly, though not exclusively, in the natural sciences.
But they can do so only if institutional infrastructures are in place
that facilitate, rather than hinder, their smooth operation. This presentation
will consider the regulation of global research networks, giving an example
of the institutional difficulties encountered by one particular e-science
project. It will propose a possible mechanism for regulation that might
ease some of the institutional difficulties of both constructing and operating
a global research project.
The presentation begins
with a recognition of the variety of regulatory issues that a global research
project might raise. These include: (i) the legal relationships among
the parties to an e-science project, (ii) the materials that each party
brings to a collaboration, particularly issues concerning the availability
of that material for use, (iii) the allocation of resources, if any, to
which a project might give rise, and (iv) the apportionment of 'responsibility'
for the project, both in the sense of credit for its achievements and
liability for any harms that it might cause.
Three things must
be remembered in designing institutional infrastructures for the regulation
of global research networks.
First it is important
to recognise that norms regulating the creation and conduct of an e-science
project can have a variety of sources. Thus a particular norm may have
the force of law; it may constitute what is sometimes known as 'soft law'
(for example institutional policies that do not have legal force but determine
institutional behaviour); or it may consist in a convention within the
life of given stakeholder community (for example, it may be a convention
regarding the attribution of credit for a particular type of research
project). Each of these different types of norm can be useful in the development
and operation of an appropriate system of regulation.
Second, it is important to remember that participants in global research
networks are operating in both different legal jurisdictions and national
academic cultures and also in different disciplinary cultures. One cannot
expect that a solution to a problem of institutional infrastructure useful
in biology will also be useful in astrophysics.
Third, it is important to recognise that all these different types of norm are developed and applied in contexts in which different players have very different incentives. This may seem obvious as regards partner institutions, but it is not often enough recognised that different players within the same institution-scientific departments, legal departments, research services departments, technology transfer sections-are usually also operating with different incentives and under different constraints. Thus, for example, simply to take account of the interests of 'the university' in designing institutional infrastructures for global research networks, is an insufficiently nuanced approach. The 'university' may seem to have very different interests when it is represented by a participating scientist, from those it has when it is represented by a member of its legal team keen to avoid exposure of the institution to legal risk. For the development of satisfactory solutions to the regulatory issues outlined above, the conflicting interests of the different players needs to be kept clearly in mind.
With all this as background,
the presentation will consider some model institutional infrastructures
for regulating the creation and operation of global research networks.
It will propose one of these as a possible way forward.